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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Given the multitude of opportunities for bid price
manipulation under the dual source competition environment, this
report discuss the various market scenarios that provide these
opportunities. The underlying premise is that different quantity
allocation methods must be developed for different scenarios.
We identify four major factors contributing to inflated bids:
(1) the minimum sustaining rate, (2) the use of the minimum total
cost rule, (3) unequal competitive positions, and (4) the lack of
incentive to compete. The minimum sustaining rate factor is a
structural issue and cannot be directly addressed. The minimum
total cost rule, because of its potential effect on bid
manipulation by the contractor, should be treated as an objective
and not as a tool in awarding annual quantity requirements. The
last two factors both contribute to a noncompetitive environment
but they differ significantly from the standpoint of Government
controllability. Therefore, we focus on developing quantity
allocation methods for these two different environments.
When one supplier has an edge in competitive position over the
other supplier, the cause of the problem must be redressed by the
Government if the future competitive environment is to be improved.
If the unequal position is the result of having one contractor
further down the experience curve, the problem can be alleviated
through the annual quantity allocation made to each contractor.
The proposed quantity allocation method under this environment uses
an objective function to minimize the sum of award prices and the
added costs (or savings) from competitive awards. Under unequal
competitive positions, we can expect bid price inflation at low
quantity from both supplier. At higher quantities, only the
supplier with the competitive edge would be in a position to
inflate the bid price. By minimizing the added costs, the proposed
allocation procedure penalizes the supplier who inflates the bids
at higher quantities and offers the other supplier an opportunity
to catch up, thus improving the future competitive environment.
There are two market scenarios in which the contractors would
have no incentive to engage in price competition. The first is
that one of the contractors does not have the capacity to produce
the majority of the annual quantity requirements. This would
create a virtual monopoly for the other source at higher
quantities. Since both contractors are assured of receiving the
minimum sustaining rate, competitive pressure does not exist at
this quantity level either. This market condition essentially is
a duopoly and not a competitive one and should never be treated by
the buyer as a competitive market. The same duopoly market
scenario exists if neither contractor is interested in using low
prices to capture the larger share of annual quantity, even if
capacity is not a problem.
By using the dual source competitive bidding under this
environment, the Government gives up much of the regulatory
authority it enjoys over verification of the contractor's cost and
pricing data, thus allowing both contractors to exploit the market
situation to their own advantage. Therefore, continuing the dual
source bidding under this market scenario is to sanction the
seller's profit enhancement strategies.
The difference in step-ladder bids in a particular year
essentially reflects the spread of fixed costs over varying number
of units produced, or the so-called production rate effect. we
discuss the measurement of production rate at length and illustrate
the problems of using the traditional learning curve and rate
formula, which estimates the parameter value of the learning curve
and the rate curve simultaneously using the same data set. Since
the learning curve reflects the cumulative learning experience
while the rate curve reflects the production setup, i.e., its cost
structure, it is conceptually more logical and operationally more
feasible to estimate the parameter of each curve with different
data.
The crux of the proposed quantity allocation method under this
market scenario is the bid solicitation stipulation that the step-
ladder bids, after adjustment for the learning curve effect, should
reflect a linear relationship on a logarithmic scale and that the
line should cross the learning curve at the base production rate
level, which is initially set at the same level as the directed
buys. The allocation of annual quantity requirements is then made
by using the minimum total cost rule.
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The two quantity allocation methods discussed in this report
vary in their focuses on the ground that each is intended for
different market scenarios. The allocation method proposed for the
market scenario with unequal competitive position has a primary
objective of enhancing future competitive environments and a
secondary objective of minimizing price gaming. An underlying
assumption is that true savings to the Government from dual source
competition is still possible if the Government can cultivate a
true competitive environment. On the other hand, the allocation
method proposed for the market in which competitive pressure is
not present directly addresses the prevention of bid price
manipulation. The underlying assumption is that true savings from
dual competition is not possible because the competitive pressure
is not present and the only alternative available to the Government
is to ensure, within its power, that bids submitted are "honest."
Our proposed allocation method is designed to provide a
disincentive for bid manipulation.
While the two quantity allocation methods are intended for
different market scenarios, it is also possible to have a hybrid
method by combining parts of each method. For example, the bid
price stipulation may be incorporated into the method proposed for
the market with unequal competitive positions. However, by
anchoring the rate curve at a certain point, it takes away the
opportunity for truly competitive pricing along with many




A key issue facing the program manager in charge of a two-
contractor weapon systems program is the allocation of annual
guantity requirements among the competing suppliers. The quantity
split issue is crucial for two reasons. First, it affects a
contractor's bidding strategy in its pursuit of profit to
compensate its investment. Second, it affects the amount the
Government pays for its weapon system requirement. This report
summarizes prior research related to contractor pricing strategy
and Government's dual source quantity-split methods and discusses
the result of our effort to develop viable methods to deal with
contractors' price gaming.
CONTRACT TYPES AND WEAPON SYSTEMS PRICING
Under a sole source procurement environment, a contract is
typically awarded in one of the variants of a cost-plus contract,
e.g., cost-plus-fixed fee, cost-plus-negotiated fee, etc. Under
FAR regulation, fixed-price negotiated contracts must follow
contract cost principles and procedures. 1 Cost or pricing data are
the factual portions of the proposal or the facts upon which the
proposal is based and, for negotiated contracts, they are subject
1 FAR, Part 31.
to verification by the Government. 2
When a second source of supply is established to generate
competitive pressure on the original source, a dual source
competition environment is created. Implicit in the current policy
and thrust on competition is the assumption that competition should
result in a fair price to both the seller and the buyer and,
hopefully, avoid the "exorbitant" price charged by the seller under
the sole source environment. However, it is often neglected that,
implicit in the doctrine of competition is the understanding that
the seller and buyer will each attempt to exploit the current
situation to its own advantage. The Government as the buyer hopes
to procure the product or service at a lower price. The seller,
on the other hand, will offer a price that will fulfill its profit
objective. Which one prevails will depend on their relative
position. In Chapter 2 we will illustrate that the dual source
environment puts the Government in a disadvantaged position in
several ways, thus allowing the contractor to utilize various price
gaming strategies to obtain higher profit than would be possible
under a sole source negotiation environment.
QUANTITY-SPLIT MODEL IS BOTH A MEANS AND AN END
Various quantity-split methods have been used by the
Government in awarding annual quantity requirements among the two
suppliers. Some have been developed with the objective of
Armed Services Pricing Manual, August 1986.
minimizing the annual cost to the Government. others have been
devised as a means to counter various price gaming strategies
utilized by contractors. We recognize that annual guantity
allocation among the two suppliers should be made with cost
minimization in mind, but we also recognize that the way the
Government splits the annual guantity affects the way the
contractors determine their pricing strategy. Therefore, one must
realize that the dual source guantity-split model is both an end
to minimize cost and a means to influence contractors' pricing
behavior.
Given the multitude of opportunities in which the contractor
can manipulate bid prices under dual source competition and the
different reasons behind each opportunity, it is obvious that no
single guantity allocation model can become the panacea. A more
logical solution is to develop different allocation methods for
different market scenarios. The program manager can then assess
the supply market condition and select the appropriate guantity-
split method. We will proceed with this premise in mind.
BRIEF OVERVIEW OF PRIOR STUDIES
Several dual source guantity-split methods have been developed
by various DoD agencies. A detailed review and evaluation of these
methods can be found in our earlier report. 3 In this section, we
Dan C. Boger and Shu S. Liao, "An Analysis of Quantity-
Split and Nonrecurring Costs under Competitive Procurement
Environment," Vol. 1, Technical Report, Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, CA. , September 1985.
will briefly review the intent of each method.
The minimum cost rule computes the total cost to the
Government for each quantity combination and selects the least cost
alternative. 4 The emphasis here is on ensuring that the government
incurs only the minimum annual cost after the contractors submitted
their bids.
Solinsky developed a mathematical model for the Army Electro-
nics Command during the competitive production of the AN/PVS-5A. 5
The method was developed primarily as a means of enhancing
aggressive bidding by relating the split in the annual award
quantity to the difference in bid prices between the two suppliers.
An elaborate procedure was developed by Pelzer for the Air
Force GAU-8 ammunition program. 6 This method specifically
incorporates quality and the contractor's price decreases over the
last three years into the quantity award determination. The
objective of this model is on rewarding good product quality and
a steep price reduction curve.
The Air Force A-10 Program used a dual competitive award
method which requires each contractor to provide a price reduction
4 See J. A. Muller, "Competitive Missile Procurement," Army
Logistician . Vol. 4., No. 6 (November-December 1972).
5 Kenneth S. Solinsky, "A Procurement Strategy for Achieving
Effective Competitive Competition While Preserving an Industrial
Mobilization Base," undated report, Army Electronics R. & D.
Command, Night Vision and Electro-Optics Laboratory.
6 Jay L. Pelzer, "Proposed Allocation Technique for a Two-
Contractor Procurement," Air Force Institute of Technology, May
1979.
curve that reflects the bids submitted for various quantities. 7
The bid prices are then averaged for each contractor and the
difference between the two average bids is used for quantity
allocation.
From this brief review of quantity allocation practices, it
should be obvious to the reader that different quantity allocation
models have been developed as a means to induce or coerce the
contractor to conform to the Government's objective. Whether or
not these attempts can bring about the desired result depends upon
the market scenario, however.
OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY
Given the multitude of opportunities for bid price manipula-
tion, our objective is to develop different quantity allocation
methods for different market scenarios. Our study is based on the
premise that achieving minimum cost to the Government for one year
does not necessarily result in the lowest cost over the long run.
Therefore, a certain degree of trade-off between minimizing annual
outlay and enhancing the competitive environment is necessary.
In Chapter 2 we will discuss various market scenarios that
provide opportunities for bid price manipulation by the contractor.
An appropriate quantity allocation method will be developed for
each scenario. Numerical examples will be used to illustrate the
algorithm.
Darrell R. Hoppe, "Dual Award and Competition -- You Can
Have Both," paper presented at the 1977 Acquisition Research
Symposium.
CHAPTER 2
ANALYSIS OF WEAPON SYSTEMS PRICING STRATEGIES
Dual source competition allows the contractor and the
government opportunities to exploit the market situation to each
party's own advantage. The government's objective is that
competition will put competitive pressure on the supplier and
result in a fair price to both parties. However, dual source
competition also creates opportunities for the contractor to
exploit. First, in return for the competitive market pressure with
competitive bidding, the government gives up much of the regulatory
authority it enjoys over verification of the contractor's cost and
pricing data. Thus, it becomes easier for the contractor to obtain
higher profit under a dual source competitive contract than under
a sole source negotiated contract if the market environment allows
it. Second, in order to maintain two sources of supply, it is
necessary to award a minimum sustaining quantity to the higher-
priced competitor. Both of these two factors put the Government
in a disadvantaged position in dealing with the contractors. In
this chapter, we will discuss various pricing strategies that can
be used by the contractor to exploit the dual source competition
situation. The discussions in this chapter will form the basis for
developing quantity split methods suitable for the appropriate
market environment.
THE STRUCTURAL OPPORTUNITIES
The Minimum Sustaining Rate
In a dual source competition environment, the lower-priced
bidder is typically awarded the major portion of the annual
quantity, but the higher bidder is also awarded a quantity that
represents the minimum level of production the contractor requires
to stay in production and remain viable. This guarantee, resulting
from the desire to maintain two viable production sources, may
diminish competitive pressures and put the government in a
disadvantaged position. As a matter of fact, there is no competi-
tive pressure at the minimum sustaining quantity level and the
Government can expect an inflated bid price from each of the two
suppliers at this level.
Production Rate Effect
Due to the splitting of the production quantity between the
two contractors, the Government must forego some of the savings
associated with cumulative production experience. The smaller
production rate also means high unit cost because neither
contractor is able to fully realize the economies of scale.
Therefore, the split award should result in higher production cost
to the contractor than awarding the entire year's production buy
to the low bidder for the given year. The argument for using dual
source competition, of course, rests on the assumption that the bid
prices should be lower under a competitive environment, compared
to a sole source acquisition, thus resulting in net savings to the
Government.
UNEQUAL COMPETITIVE POSITION BETWEEN CONTRACTORS
If the second supplier is established after the first supplier
has had some production experience with the weapon system in
question, the competitive position of the two contractors may be
unequal. Under this circumstance, the anticipated competitive
pressure from dual sourcing may diminish, or even evaporate
completely.
The First Supplier Is Further Down the Learning Curve
Being the developer of the system and having had some
production experience, the first supplier often enjoys a cost
advantage over the new supplier. Other things being equal, the
more experienced producer will have a lower production cost and can
under-bid the new supplier. This problem is compounded if the
first supplier continues to win the majority of annual quantities
on a dual award environment.
The Second Supplier's Capacity Is Limited
There is a dilemma facing the Government in establishing the
second supply source. The combined production capacity may far
exceed the actual requirements if the second source is established
at the same production capacity level as the original source. On
the other hand, if the second source's production capacity is
established at a lower level than the first source, the second
source would not be in a position to bid at the higher percentages
of the annual requirement, thus creating a virtual monopoly for the
original source at higher quantities.
OPPORTUNITIES CREATED BY OTHER PARTIES' ACTIONS
In addition to the structural opportunities and unequal
competitive position, a contractor can also take advantage of other
parties' actions and exploit the dual source competition
environment.
Government's Attempt to Minimize the Total Cost
The logical and widely used quantity allocation method
involves computing the total cost to the government for each
quantity split combination and selecting the least cost
alternative. This method would ensure that the government incurs
only the minimum cost possible according to the bid prices
submitted by the competitors. However, this quantity allocation
method also encourages the contractor to "front load" the bids.
By raising its bids on the smaller quantities, a contractor can
increase its chance of getting the larger portion of the annual
buy.
Table 2.1 illustrates this price gaming. Part A assumes that
the bid prices submitted by both suppliers are realistic. Under
this circumstance, the minimum cost to the Government is $590,
which results from awarding 70% of the annual quantity to X and
30% to Y. Since X is the low price bidder, it is fair for X to be
awarded the majority of the quantity. Now let us assume that Y is
also interested in capturing the majority of the quantity but
cannot compete on price because of its higher cost. If Y deli-
berately inflates its bid price for the low quantity, it is
conceivable that Y would end up being the winner if the minimum
total cost method is used for quantity allocation. Part B
illustrates this scenario. Although the $630 total is the lowest
of the three quantity combinations, it is not the true minimum
total cost because the bid prices include padding induced by the
government's quantity allocation method.
Table 2.1
Price Manipulation Under the Minimum Cost Method
Contractor X Contractor Y Total
Quantity Bid Total Quantity Bid Total Cost
A: No Price Gaming
30 $70 $210 70 $60 $420 $630
50 60 300 50 70 350 650
70 50 350 30 80 240 590 *
B: With Price Gaming
30 $70 $210 70 $60 $420 $630 *
50 60 300 50 70 350 650
70 50 350 30 95 285 535
* Minimum total cost.
Lack of Incentive to Compete under Duopoly
In economic theory, competition implies that there is a large
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number of suppliers. Dual source "competition" is in essence a
misnomer, as there are only two suppliers. Under duopoly, each
supplier is concerned about what the other supplier does. If one
supplier senses that the other supplier has no economic incentive
or is not in a position to engage in price competition, the
pressure of competition disappears and both suppliers can charge
what the market can bear. This is probably the worst scenario
faced by the Government, as it loses much of its regulatory power
under the so-called "competitive" acguisition.
SUMMARY OF PRICE GAMING SCENARIOS
Since different market scenarios call for different guantity
allocation methods, a summary of opportunities created by dual
sourcing and their resultant pricing strategies would facilitate
understanding of the guantity allocation methods to be discussed
in the next chapter:
Inflated bids at






total cost rule X
Lack of incentive
to compete X
We may infer that under a dual source environment neither
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contractor would have any logical reason to submit a competitive
bid price for the low quantity portion of the annual requirement.
If the competitive position of the two contractors are not equal
or the economic condition does not offer any incentive for the
contractors to compete in price, then the market is essentially
noncompetitive. It should be emphasized that the scenarios
contributing to this noncompetitive environment are significantly
different from the standpoint of Government controllability and
therefore require different counter-strategies. In the case of
unequal competitive position, the cause of the problem can be
redressed by the Government's remedial action to improve the future
competitive environment. On the other hand, if the economic
environment does not offer any incentive for the contractor to
compete in price, the procuring agency can only deal with the
symptom, but not the cause. Therefore, different quantity split
methods must be developed for these two market scenarios.
The effect of a production rate decrease on a contractor's
production cost is a structural issue and the resulting cost
increase can be justified. Therefore, no additional action by the
Government is necessary except to ensure that the cost increase is
reasonable.
Of course, the minimum total cost rule should remain a major
factor in every quantity allocation method. However, because of
its potential effect on bid price manipulation by the contractor,
the minimum total cost rule should be treated as a major objective
but not as the only tool in awarding annual quantity requirements.
12
CHAPTER 3
A QUANTITY SPLIT METHOD FOR UNEQUAL COMPETITIVE POSITIONS
When one supplier has an edge in competitive position over the
other supplier, the cause of the problem must be redressed by the
Government if the future competitive environment is to be improved.
If the unequal position is the result of having one contractor
further down the experience curve, the problem can be alleviated
through the annual quantity allocation made to each contractor.
In this chapter, we will present the quantity allocation procedure
under this environment. The objective function of the proposed
allocation procedure is to minimize the sum of award prices and the
added costs (or savings) from competitive awards. Under unequal
competitive positions, we can expect bid price inflation at low
quantity from both supplier. At higher quantity, only the supplier
with the competitive edge would be in a position to inflate the bid
price. By minimizing the added costs, the proposed allocation
procedure penalizes the supplier who inflates the bids at higher
quantity and offers the other supplier an opportunity to catch up,
thus improving the future competitive environment. For convenience
of presentation, some variables are abbreviated. Appendix A lists
definitions of abbreviations and variables used in this chapter.
ASSUMPTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS
Several assumptions and conditions are required in our
discussion of the quantity allocation method. The following
13
modifications and assumptions are applicable unless specified
otherwise:
1. Each contractor has received at least two separate annual
awards for a quantity of units in which the prices were
negotiated. The negotiated prices are crucial to the develop-
ment of the proposed award allocation technique and its
subsequent effectiveness. The objectives of the government
procurement team address this by ensuring, to the maximum
extent practicable, that the final negotiated award prices are
reasonable and fair to both transaction parties. The initial
two or more annual program awards for each individual contrac-
tor, which involved negotiated pricing, sufficiently reflect
their particular existing learning curve effect.
2. The initial awards for each contractor, which were negotiated-
price directed buys, were each for an equal quantity of units.
This permits development of each contractor's learning curve
with equivalent annual production rates. On the other hand,
if equal quantity awards for each year are impractical, a
hypothetical price for the same quantity as the first year
should be negotiated even though the award quantity will be
different.
3. Each contractor will be able to deliver all quantities it has
bid on in a timely manner and in the condition as specified
in the contract. This will hold the bidding contractors to
the terms of the solicitation and contracts issued.
4
.
The units produced by the contractor are assumed to be
identical in performance characteristics and technical
specifications.
5. Annual procurement solicitations requested bids in a specified
step-ladder format.
6. The contracts involved, whether negotiated or dual source
competed, are firm-fixed-price contracts.
7. All prices, whether negotiated or bid, are based on constant
dollars, using DoD escalation indices for price level
adjustments.
8. No significant competitive advantage (Government Facilities,
Transportation Factors, Government Furnished Materials, etc.)
is involved.
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OVERVIEW OF THE ALLOCATION TECHNIQUE
The following six steps briefly describe the proposed
quantity-split technique for the dual source competitive situation.
A more detailed discussion of these individual steps, along with
illustrative examples, will follow.
Step 1: Calculate the Necessary Learning Curves.
A learning curve is established for each contractor by
using their respective, initial two or more annual program
awards. These were directed buys and their prices were
determined by negotiation. Beltramo's method used the
negotiated prices that already existed for current and
past programs. 1 The directed buy initial awards,
associated with this allocation technique, were
recommended to have their prices negotiated with this
particular learning curve determination in mind.
Step 2: Request Step-ladder Bids.
Request step-ladder bids from each contractor for a range
of specific quantities or percentages of the total annual
buy requirement when each annual procurement solicitation
occurs. The lowest quantity that bids should be requested
for is the MSR.
Step 3: Construct the Technique's Objective Function.
This quantity-split technique's mathematical objective
function is used to determine the annual award allocation
quantities. This objective function, which is to be
minimized, is composed of two specific factors from each
contractor's procurement data. The objective function is
defined by adding all these two factors together.
The first factor is the total bid cost charged to the
government for the particular award quantity under
consideration. This factor is included so that the
objective function attempts to attain the minimum total
bid cost charged to the government in order to satisfy the
annual procurement requirement.
The second factor is an estimated measure of the added
1
M. C. Beltramo, "A Case Study of the Sparrow AIM-7F,"
Program Manager . Vol. XIV, No. 5 (September-October), pp. 28-35.
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costs or savings resulting from competition. By incor-
porating this factor into the objective function, the
process of selecting the suggested award allocation
attempts to minimize the added costs, or maximize the





































The methodology used to estimated savings or added costs
resulting from competition involves extrapolating the
learning curve established by prior award guantity data
and their corresponding negotiated prices. Assume Points
# 1 and 2 in Figure 3.1 represent prior award guantity
data and the solid line passing through them the resultant
learning curve, the learning curve may be extrapolated as
shown by the dashed line. Point #3 in Figure 3.1 may be
L. A. Kratz, J. W. Drinnon, and J. B. Hiller, Establishing
Competitive Production Sources , Defense Systems Management College,
1984; Beltramo, op. cit., pp. 28-35.
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interpreted as the estimated cost for the next contract
award of the same lot quantity as in previous awards. If
the estimated cost is larger than the bid cost, then the
difference represents an estimated savings due to compe-
tition and results in a negative value for that particular
contractor's second factor in the objective function.
This situation is shown by Point #5 Figure 3.1. If the
estimated cost for the particular award quantity being
considered was less than the bid price, then the
difference represents an estimated added cost due to the
competition and is reflected in a positive value in the
objective function for that particular contractor's second
factor. This is the case for Point #4 in Figure 3.1.
Since the estimated added costs due to competition
represent the effect of contractor price gaming and
production rate change [Ref. 7: p. 59], the objective
function attempts to reduce this effect.
Step 4: Substitute step-ladder bid data into the Objective
Function.
Substitute the pertinent data from each contractor and
calculate total bid cost and estimated cost differential
for each quantity-split combination.
Step 5: Determine the Recommended Award Allocation.
Determine the quantity-split combination which results in
the minimum value in the objective function.
Step 6: Determine Total Annual Award Cost.
From the annual award allocation computed in Step 5,
determine the total cost to the government for the annual
procurement requirement.
ILLUSTRATION OP THE ALLOCATION TECHNIQUE
This technique's six steps briefly mentioned above will be
illustrated in this section. All monetary values involved must be
expressed in constant dollars. We will use a missile program
identified as X for illustration purpose.
Step l: Calculate the Necessary Learning Curves.
17
1985 500 2,800 1,400,000
1986 500 2,500 1,250,000 500
1987 500 1,700 850,000 500
a. List Initial Awards Data
Arrange the quantity and negotiated price data, from the
initial two or more awards for each contractor. Table 3.1 illus-
trates this procedure for Program X.
Table 3.1
INITIAL NEGOTIATED ANNUAL AWARDS FOR PROGRAM X
(FY1986 $)
Contractor A Contractor B
Year Quantity Unit Cost Total Cost Quantity Unit Cost Total Cost
Q-A CAN-A CTN-A Q-B CAN-B CTN-B
3,450 1,725,000
2,750 1,375,000
Q-A = Quantity of Contractor A's Annual Award
Q-B = Quantity of Contractor B's Annual Award
CAN-A = Cost, Average Unit Negotiated, for Contractor A's Award
CAN-B = Cost, Average Unit Negotiated, for Contractor B's Award
CTN-A = Cost, Total Negotiated for Contractor A's Annual Award
CTN-B = Cost, Total Negotiated for Contractor B's Annual Award
b. Determine Algebraic Midpoints
Estimate the algebraic midpoint (M) of each lot
which is necessary for developing the average incremental unit cost
learning curve. These algebraic midpoints are where the annual
award's estimated average unit cost on the curve equals the average
unit cost for the entire annual award. In order to estimate these
midpoints, the following commonly used formulas are applied:
First Award Midpoint = ^— + 0.5
Subsequent Award Midpoint = --- + Sum of all preceding lots
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The algebraic lot midpoints for Program X data shown in Table
3.1 are:




d. Determine the Learning Curves
If there are three or more data points available, the standard
least squares regression method may be used to determine the
learning curve for each contractor. This learning curve is in the
power curve equation form
CAN = aMb
where CAN = Average negotiated cost per unit
a = the theoretical first unit cost
M = lot midpoint
b = the learning curve slope
If there are only two data points available for analysis, the





The learning curve equations computed from Table 3.1 data are
shown below:
Contractor Equation Slope
A CAN-A = 8,512.2 60m*' 2092 ' 86.50177%
B CAN-B = 7,486.084M ( " 1513) 90.04549%
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Step 2: Request Step-ladder Bids
Figure 3.2















Program X - Contractor B Price Data
1000
_









Solicit bids in a step-ladder format to achieve full and open
competition as required by The Competition In Contracting Act
(CICA)
.
3 Table 3.2 shows the hypothetical step-ladder bids for
PL 98-369
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FY1988 requirements from the two contractors of Program X. These
step-ladder bids are illustrated with log-log graphs in Figures 3.2
and 3.3 for contractors A and B respectively. The bid data plotted
are, M-A with CAB-A in Figure 3.2 and M-B with CAB-B in Figure 3.3.
These plotted data are referred to as step-ladder "bids" for FY1988
buy in the legend of both figures.
Table 3.2
FY1988 ANNUAL AWARD STEP-LADDER BIDS FOR PROGRAM X
(Total annual award quantity, QT = 1000 units)
(FY1986 $)
Contractor A












% Quantity Midpoint Average Bid Price Total Cost
QT Q-B M-B CAB-B CTB-B
10 100 1,050 5,000 500,000
20 200 1,100 3,800 760,000
30 300 1,150 3,500 1,050,000
40 400 1,200 3,100 1,240,000
50 500 1,250 2,900 1,430,000
60 600 1,300 2,850 1,710,000
70 700 1,350 2,700 1,890,000
80 800 1,400 2,750 2,200,000
90 900 1,450 2,800 2,520,000
CAB-A = Average Unit Cost bid by Contractor A
CAB-B = Average Unit Cost bid by Contractor B
CTB-A = Total Bid Cost for that quantity from Contractor A













The bid data are constructed to reflect the typical price
gaming behaviors discussed in Chapter 2 . Front loading is the
inflation of guotes for the smaller award guantities. This
strategy is observed in the plotted step-ladder bids for FY1988 by
the steep upward bend at the low end of guantities. In our
example, Contractor B has cumulatively produced less missiles than
Contractor A prior to the FY1988 procurement solicitation. Thus,
Contractor B could believe that Contractor A has a sufficient cost
advantage to win a majority of the annual award. Therefore, Con-
tractor B could possibly attempt to generate higher profits at a
lower annual award guantity. This situation could be reflected by
Contractor B having a more pronounced (steeper) front loaded price
gaming strategy than Contractor A, as illustrated in Figures 3.2
and 3.3.
End loading, bid price inflation of the larger annual award
amounts, is reflected by the upward curvature of bids at the high
end of the award guantities. In the Program X example,
Contractor A features a higher degree of end loading than
Contractor B which could suggest it believes Contractor B does not
have enough production experience to be the lower bidder.
The strategy of price inflation over the entire guantity
range is self-explanatory. This strategy is depicted in Figures
3.2 and 3.3 for Contractors A and B respectively by the FY1988
step-ladder bids being consistently above their associated
extrapolated actual award learning curves. Also, in each contrac-
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tor's case, the FY1988 quote for 500 units was higher than the
negotiated award of 500 units for the prior fiscal year.
Step 3: Construct the Objective Function
The proposed quantity allocation technique uses an objective
function, similar to the linear programming context, to determine
the annual award allocation. The decision variables are the
specific quantities to allocate to each producer as an annual
award. The decision variables for Program X are therefore Q-A and
Q-B. The objective function value in this method is a "total
pseudo-cost" henceforth referred to as "Z". This technique selects
the annual award allocation combination which results in the
minimum value (in constant dollar units) for Z. Only those
combinations of contractor award quantities which exactly satisfy
the total annual procurement requirement (QT) can be considered.
The objective function addresses two primary concerns in
determining its recommended annual award allocation. In order to
stress the concern for minimizing the cost to the government, the
objective function incorporates the total bid cost for the
procurement requirement, for each award combination considered.
A measure of the competitiveness of the bids, the difference
between the bid and estimated costs, is incorporated into the
objective function in order to address concerns for minimizing
contractor price gaming and production rate inefficiencies.
The objective function requires two specific items of
information, from the data on each contractor, in order to
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determine the value of Z. The necessary pieces of information are
the total bid price, and the estimated total negotiated price,
associated with each acceptable award combination.
The objective function incorporates factors which enable
it to simultaneously consider both the total requirement recurring
cost and the estimated total requirement recurring cost differen-
tial. This differential will henceforth be called the "estimated
total cost differential." It is the difference between the total
recurring costs for an annual requirement when determined from bid
prices and when determined from estimated negotiated prices. 4
The factors that incorporate concerns for the minimum total
cost into the objective function are the total bid costs from the
specific award combinations. For Program X these factors are the
total bid costs for A (CTB-A) and B (CTB-B) respectively.
The estimated total cost differentials are obtained by
subtracting the estimated total negotiated costs from their
associated total bid costs. These differentials correspond to the
estimated additional recurring costs (for positive values) or the
estimated recurring cost savings (for negative values) resulting
from the use of competition instead of negotiation for award price
4 Michael N. Beltramo, "A Case Study of the Sparrow AIM-7F,
'
Program Manager . Vol. XIV, No. 5 (October 1985), pp. 29-31.
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determination. 5 The estimated total negotiated costs are
determined by inserting the algebraic midpoint (M) of the guantity
involved into the corresponding contractor's extrapolated learning
curve eguation. The resulting value (CAB) is then multiplied by
the guantity involved to yield estimated total negotiated costs.
The estimated total cost differential is substituted into the
objective function to compute the value of Z.
For Program X, the estimated negotiated costs (Est. CTN-A and
Est. CTN-B) are determined by extrapolating the learning curves and
multiplying the estimated unit price (CAN) by the guantity, as
shown below:





= 8,512.260 * M-A^ *^<.) it Q_A
Est. CTN-B = Est. CAN-B * Q-B
= 7,486.084 * M-B (
~* 1513)
* Q-B
Est. CTD-A = CTB-A - Est. CTN-A
Est. CTD-B = CTB-B - Est. CTN-B
where:
Est. CTN-A = Estimated Total Negotiated Cost of an annual award
guantity to Contractor A as determined with
extrapolation of the corresponding established
learning curve involved.
Est. CTN-B = Estimated Total Negotiated Cost of an annual award
guantity to Contractor B as determined with
extrapolation of the corresponding established
learning curve involved.
5 E. T. Lovett and M. G. Norton, "Determining and Forecasting
Savings from Competing Previously Sole Source/Noncompetitive
Contracts," Army Procurement Research Office, APRO 709-3, October
1978; Kratz, Drinnon, and Hiller, op. cit.
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Est. CTD-A = Estimated Total Cost Differential included in the
associated Total Bid Cost for an annual procurement
quantity for Contractor A. It is the difference
between the Total Bid Cost and Estimated Total
Negotiated Cost at that quantity.
Est. CTD-B = Estimated Total Cost differential included in the
associated Total Bid Cost for an annual procurement
quantity for Contractor B. It is the difference
between the Total Bid Cost and Estimated Total
Negotiated Cost at that quantity.
In order to consider the total cost and estimated total cost
differential simultaneously, these two cost items are added
together for each individual contractor. So, the factors from each
contractor used in the objective function would be:
Objective Function Factors from each contractor =
Total Bid Cost to obtain a particular quantity from the
contractor (CTB) + The associated Estimated Total Cost
Differential for that contractor (CTD)
The objective function is then defined by adding together the
factors from each contractor into one equation as follows:
Objective Function:
Minimize: Z = Total Bid Cost to obtain a particular quantity
from A + The associated Estimated Total Cost
Differential for A + Total Bid Cost to obtain
a particular quantity from B + The associated
Estimated Total Cost Differential for B
or Minimize Z = (CTB-A + CTD-A) + (CTB-B + CTD-B)
Step 4: Substitute Data from Quantity-splits into Z
a. Evaluate Input Variables for Objective Function
For each quantity-split combination (C) , determine its
specific variables which are used in the objective function. For
Program X the input variables are computed as shown in Table 3.3.
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Table 3.3
OBJECTIVE FUNCTION VALUES FOR EACH QUANTITY-SPLIT LEVEL
(QT = 1,000 units)
Contractor A
;QT Q-A CTB-A Est. CTN-A Est. CTD-A
1 10 100 300,000 183,076.37 116,923,,63
2 20 200 500,000 363,728.89 136,271, , 11
3 30 300 660,000 542,092.42 117,907.,58
4 40 400 820,000 718,290.00 101,710,,00
5 50 500 980,000 892,434.20 87,565,,80
6 60 600 1, , 170,000 1,,064,628.30 105,371,,66
7 70 700 1,,400,000 1 ,234,967.40 165,032,,55
8 80 800 1,,680,000 1 ,403,539.20 276,460,,80
9 90 900 2,,070,000 1,,570,424.60 499,575,,36
Contractor B
1 90 900 2,520,000
2 80 800 2,200,000
3 70 700 1,890,000
4 60 600 1,710,000
5 50 500 1,450,000
6 40 400 1,240,000
7 30 300 1,050,000
8 20 200 760,000
9 10 100 500,000










b. Calculate the Objective Function (Z)
With the values of input variables determined, we may
substitute these values into the objective function of each
quantity-split combination and determine the value for Z. Table
3.4 displays this procedure for Program X.
Step 5: Determine the Recommended Award Allocation
Examine the Z values calculated for each quantity-split
combination to determine which one has the lowest numerical value.
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The lowest (Z) value identifies the quantity-split combination
suggested by this technique. Specifically, it is that combination
which was used to generate this lowest (Z) value. For Program X
the lowest value for the objective function (Z = 2,694,487) is
found in Combination "5" (50% awarded to each contractor) , as shown
in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4
COMPUTATION OF THE OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS
Z = [CTB-A + Est. CTD-A] + [CTB-B + Est. CTD-B]
Contractor A Contractor B
c CTB-A Est. CTD-A CTB-B Est. CTD-13 Z
1 Z=| 300,000 + 116,924] + [2,520,000 + 279,915] = 3,216,839
2 Z=j 500,000 + 136,271] + [2,200,000 + 198,216] = 3,034,487
3 Z=| 660,000 + 117,907] + [1,890,000 + 128,776] = 2,796,683
4 Z=| 820,000 + 101,710] + [1,710,000 + 191,736] = 2,823,446
5 Z=| 980,000 + 87,566] + [1,450,000 + 177,251] s 2,694,487
6 Z=| 1 ,170,000 + 105,372] + [1,240,000 + 215,494] = 2,730,865
7 Z=| 1 ,400,000 + 165,033] + [1,050,000 + 276,657] = 2,891,690
8 Z=| 1 ,680,000 + 276,461] + [ 760,000 + 240,960] = 2,957,421
9 Z=| 2 ,070,000 + 499,575] + [ 500,000 + 238,647] = 3,308,222
step 6 : Determine Total Annual Award Cost
With the quantity-split decision made, we may calculate the
total cost to the Government associated with these award alloca-
tions by adding together the bid costs (CTB-A and CTB-B) . For
Program X, the award quantities determined by the objective
function were Q-A and Q-B both being allocated 500 units to produce
for the FY1988 buy. The total annual procurement cost for FY1988
in Program X would be:
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FY88 Total Cost = CTB-A + CTB-B
= $ 980,000 + $ 1,450,000 = $ 2,430,000
RATIONALIZATION OF THE QUANTITY ALLOCATION TECHNIQUE
If we apply the Minimum Total Cost Rule to the hypothetical
data of Program X, we would have allocated 60% to Contractor A and
40% to Contractor B, which would have resulted in the lowest cost
to the government for the year. However, one should keep in mind
that the market scenario used in constructing the hypothetical data
was that Contractor A has the advantage of being the more
experienced producer. Therefore, Contractor B is not in a position
to compete with A in price. Allocating 60% of the current quantity
requirement to A would have exacerbated this problem and put
Contractor B further behind in its competitive position.
Our proposed quantity allocation model avoids this problem.
The 50-50 split is the result of partially trying to minimize the
total cost to the Government and partially trying to minimize the
price differential due to price gaming. If we focus on the price
differential due to price gaming, then Combination 3 (which would
allocate 30% to A and 70% to B) would be adopted. This allocation
method would have improved Contractor B's competitive position for




Total Bid Prices and Estimated Differentials
Bid Prices Estimated Differentials
C CTB-A CTB-B Total CTD-A CTD-B Total
1 300,000 2,520,000 2,820,000 116,924 279,915 396,839
2 500,000 2,200,000 2,700,000 136,271 198,216 334,487
3 660,000 1,890,000 2,550,000 117,907 128,776 246,683
4 820,000 1,710,000 2,530,000 101,710 191,736 293,446
5 980,000 1,450,000 2,430,000 87,566 177,251 264,817
6 1,170,000 1,240,000 2,410,000 105,372 215,494 320,866
7 1,400,000 1,050,000 2,450,000 165,033 276,657 441,690
8 1,680,000 760,000 2,440,000 276,461 240,960 517,421
9 2,070,000 500,000 2,570,000 499,575 238,647 738,222
A CASE STUDY
In this section, we will apply the proposed quantity-split
method to a real world case. The identity of the test program is
masked and will be referred to as Program Y. The selection of the
program was based mainly on data availability. The two contractors
will be labeled A and B respectively. Although Contractor B is the
second supplier and presumably would be less experienced than
Contractor A in producing the product, its step-ladder quotes do
show a bid price lower than that of Contractor A at one particular
quantity level. Table 3.6 lists the negotiated unit prices for
Years 1 and 2 and the step-ladder bids for Year 3. Note that
Contractor B's quotes are consistently higher than A's except for
the level of 2,934 units. This, of course, is a classical example
of price gaming. With our focus on minimizing the Z value (total
of award costs and price gaming differential, we will examine how
the Year 3 quantity requirements are allocated to the two parties.
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Table 3.6
Program Y Price Data
(Constant $)
Contractor A
Year Quanti ty Price



























With only one negotiated contract awarded to Contractor B, it
is impossible to determine the price-reduction curve with objective
data. Instead of using an arbitrary number, we used all available
data in Table 3.6 to establish a curve. This is, of course,
strictly an expedient procedure. No attempt to justify this
procedure will be made, as the main purpose is to illustrate the
application of the proposed quantity allocation method. The
following curves are established using this procedure:
Est. CAN-A = 107,152 (M-A) ( ' 166)
EST. CAN-B = 120,226 (-B) 193)
Year 3 Allocation Results
When the Year 3 step-ladder bids were utilized by the proposed
quantity-split technique, the award allocations thus determined
were the same as those using the Minimum Total Cost rule. It can
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1 424 3774 107,,640, 290
2 1264 2934 110, 823,,312
3 2011 2187 HI, 606, 578
4 2187 2011 111, 696, 604
5 2934 1264 HI, 180, 679
6 3774 424 108, 529, 435
be seen from Table 3.7 that both the minimum Z value (identifies
proposed technique's suggested award combination) and the minimum
CTB (identifies MTC rule suggested award combination) occur at the
same specific award combination. This selected combination is
combination 2: 1,264 units to Contractor A and 2,934 units to
Contractor B at a total cost of $120,998,144.
Table 3.7
Program Y Quantity Allocation
(Year 3 Q-T = 4198 units)
Quantity Estimated Cost Total Bid Cost







Note that Contractor B submitted a very competitive bid for
2,934 units, which makes the case less than ideal to demonstrate
our proposed quantity allocation technique. If Contractor B is
indeed less competitive than A, a more realistic bid for 2,934
units would be approximately $28,500 per unit. Relevant items for
quantity combination #2 may be recomputed as follows:
C Q-A Q-B CTN CTB Z
2 1264 2934 110,823,312 127,957,590 145,091,868
Allocation #3 would become the recommended quantity-split for
Year 3. This would award 2,011 units to Contractor A and 2,187
units to Contractor B, a logical solution to bring B to a more
competitive position for future price competition.
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CHAPTER 4
QUANTITY 8PLIT WHEN COMPETITIVE PRESSURE IS NOT PRESENT
There are two market scenarios in which the contractors would
have no incentive to engage in price competition. The first is
that one of the contractors does not have the capacity to produce
the majority of the annual quantity requirements. This would
create a virtual monopoly for the other source at higher
quantities. Compounded by the fact that competitive pressure never
exists at lower quantities, this market scenario essentially is a
duopoly and not a competitive one and should never be treated by
the buyer as a competitive market.
The same duopoly market exists if neither contractor is
interested in using low prices to capture the larger share of
annual quantity, even if the capacity is not a problem. This
phenomenon is most likely to be found during a sectoral economic
boom.
As discussed earlier in this report, by using the dual source
competitive bidding, the Government gives up much of its regulatory
authority it enjoys over verification of the contractor's cost and
pricing data. Competition allows both parties to exploit the
market situation to their own advantage. With the absence of
competitive pressure on contractors, the Government loses the only
advantage it has in dual source competition. Therefore, continuing
the dual source bidding under this market scenario grants a license
for profit enhancement to the sellers. In this chapter, we will
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discuss the quantity award method under these noncompetitive market
scenarios.
PRODUCTION RATE CONSIDERATIONS
The higher bid prices for lower quantities are justifiable
according to the theory of economies of scale. This phenomenon is
recognized by acquisition analysts in the form of adding another
variable to the traditional price-reduction curve (hereafter,
learning curve) as follows: 6
Z = aXbRc = YRC
where: Y = unit cost of the item as projected on the
learning curve, Y = aXb
Z = unit cost of the item, production rate
effect considered,
X = cumulative quantity associated with the
learning curve computation,
R = production rate measure,
b & c = slopes of the X and R curves.
While this general formulation for production rate is widely
used, little has been done to examine the implications of the
different ways the production rate factor can be measured. Current
practice is to use the annual production quantity as a surrogate
6 For example, see John C. Bemis, "A Model for Examining the
Cost Implications of Production Rate," Product Engineering Service
Office, Defense Logistics Agency, undated; L. C. Cox and J. S.
Gansler, "Evaluating the Impact of Quantity, Rate, and
Competition," Concepts: The Journal of Defense Systems Acquisition
Management
. Vol. 4, No. 4 (Autumn 1981), pp. 29-70.
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measure of production rate. With this measure, the definition of
the a of the above equation (referred to as the theoretical first
unit cost in learning curve theory) is the unit cost when X=l and
R=l. While this interpretation seems logical, it does result in
some awkward numbers, especially in the analysis of annual step-
ladder bids, because of the fact that R=l is not close to the
relevant production range.
To illustrate the significance of this issue, let us assume
that we have the data of two educational buys which were negotiated
by the Government and the contractor, as shown below:
Lot # Quantity Unit Price Algebraic Lot Midpoint
1 100 $43,773 33.9
2 100 31,035 147.0
Since there are only two data points, only the learning rate may
be considered. We may use the following formula to determine the
learning rate:




where Mj represents the algebraic midpoint of each lot. The slope
of the learning curve for our illustrative data may now be
determined as follows:
31,035L°9 "43 773"
b = TT^ 1^— = -0.234422 or 85% curve
t,-w, 147.0Log
--3375-
The first unit cost can be readily obtained by substituting the
value of b into the basic learning curve equation:
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43,779 = a (3 3.9)"0234422
a = 100,000
Note that implicit in the above computation is the production rate
of 100 units.
Using a Ratio as the Rate Measure
Let us assume that competitive awards will begin in Year 3 and
step-ladder bids are solicited from the contractors. The
difference in bid prices for various quantity levels during this
single year, in principle, should reflect the production rate
effect only. Let us further assume that the slope for the rate
curve is 80%. If we want to evaluate the reasonableness of bids
at different production rate levels, the most logical approach is
to anchor the rate measure at a given level within the relevant
rate range, e.g., 100 units (base rate = 100), and measure
different quantity levels as a ratio of the base rate. If the rate
curve is known or agreed upon by both parties, the honest bids for




r = the slope of the production rate curve, and
d = the logarithm of R (the rate ratio measure) divided by the
logarithm of 2.
For example, with the assumed 80% rate curve, the honest bid for
300 units may be computed as follows:
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Z3Q0 = 2 5,554(0. 8 )'°9(3)/l09(2) = 25 , 554 ( . 8 ) 1 *5 = 17,942
If the parameter value of the rate term is unknown, it can be
estimated from annual step ladder bids as follows. Since we define
Z = aXbRc or YRC , the ratio of honest bid prices at various quantity
levels as a function of the long-term LC may be determined as
follows:
Rc = Z/Y, or Z/aXb
We may use the computed ratios for various bid quantity levels to
determine the parameter value for the rate term. Table 4.1 shows
the procedures described above.
Table 4.1
Estimating Rate Effect from Year 3 Step-Ladder Bids
(a = 100000, Total Previous Quantity = 200 units)
Bid aXb aXbRc Rc R
Quantity Midpoint m (Z) Z/Y Q/100
50 224.9 28,088 35,111 1.250 0.5
100 248.4 27,442 27,442 1.000 1
200 293.5 26,390 21,112 0.800 2
300 336.7 25,554 17,942 0.702 3
400 378.6 24,861 15,911 0.640 4
500 419.5 24,269 14,456 0.576 5
Figure 4.1 shows the relationship between Z/Y and the rate
measure, R. Note that the honest bids should reflect a straight
line on a log-log graph as shown in Figure 4.1. The slope of the
rate curve can be derived from the values of the last two columns
of Table 4.1 the same way the learning curve slope is derived. In
our case, the exponent, c, is -0.3218, which represents an 80%
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Figure 4.1
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curve, the slope we used to generate the hypothetical data.
Using Absolute Lot Size Value as the Rate Measure
If we use the lot size directly as the measure of the
production rate, the definition of a is necessarily changed to the
first unit cost in the LC when X=l and R=l. Since the rates for
the first two buys are not unity, it is impossible to determine
the parameter value of the rate term unless there are at least
three, and preferably more, data points.
By combining the two education buys and the Year 3 bids, we
can derive the parameter values for the Z equation as shown below:
a = 440,352
b = -0.23445 or 85% learning curve
c = -0.321915 or 80% rate curve
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The only difference in results is the first unit cost, a. The high
value of the first unit cost is due to the implicit assumption that
it is for X=l and R=l, which is not close to the relevant
production rate range.
The rate effect for Year 3 Step-Ladder bids may be estimated
as shown in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2
Estimating Rate Effect from Year 3 Step-Ladder Bids
(a = 440352, Total Previous Quantity = 200 units)










100 248.4 120,853 27,442 0.227 100
200 293.5 116,217 21,112 0.182 200
300 336.7 112,535 17,942 0.159 300
400 378.6 109,483 15,911 0.145 400
500 419.5 106,881 14,456 0.135 500
Figure 4.2




















The Y and Z values in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, along with the two
educational buys, are plotted in Figure 4.2 for comparison. The
top solid line represents the learning curve portion of the Z
eguation when the rate is measured by the absolute value of the
production lot (i.e., a = 440,352) while the bottom solid line
represents the learning curve portion of Z when the rate is
measured as a function of a base rate (i.e., a = 100,000). Note
that the two negotiated buys and step-ladder bids are better
represented by the bottom line. What Figure 4.2 shows is that the
rate measure should preferably be expressed as a function of a base
which falls within the relevant guantity range the contractor is
expected to produce.
Other Considerations
There are several other practical considerations that favor
the use of a ratio as the rate measure. First, the data base
available for LC and rate curve determination is typically scanty.
Using unity as the rate base requires both LC and R as the
independent variables in parameter determination. Having to use
two independent variables reduces the degrees of freedom and
increases the estimating error accordingly.
Secondly, while LC captures the effect of cumulative production
experience (a continuous phenomenon)
,
the production rate term
captures the effect of spreading fixed costs over varying numbers
of units. During the early stage of production, the amount of
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production setup. Therefore, the effect of production rate on unit
costs may not stabilize until after the production setup and its
inherent cost structure is stabilized. Trying to derive a rate
curve with historical data from early stages of production is
probably unreliable. Figure 4.3 reflects this problem. Assuming
the firm expanded it production setup in the first three years,
resulting in higher fixed overhead costs in successive years. The
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total costs for each successive years are designated as TCI, TC2
and TC3 respectively. If the Government procured 50 units, 100
units, and 200 units during the first three years, the unit costs
to the Government would be Points A, B', and C*. Using these three
data point to derive a rate curve would produce an erroneous curve
as shown by the dashed line. The slope of the dashed line is
flattened by the changing cost structure. On the other hand, the
step-ladder bids reflect the spreading of fixed costs in a
particular year (Points A, B, and C) and, therefore, are most
appropriate for estimating the parameter value for the rate term.
Expressing the production rate as a function of a base rate
within the relevant range allows the analyst to estimate the LC
from scanty historical data with more confidence and adjust for
the applicable rate effect. It also facilitates the comparison of
the current step-ladder bids with the historical contract awards.
Let us use our numerical example to illustrate this point.
The two negotiated buys were for 100 units each; therefore, the
line representing the bids for the third year requirement should
cross the assumed 85% LC at a the point which represents the 100
unit base rate level (or $27,442 per unit) and the algebraic
midpoint of this lot on the learning curve, if the bids are not
inflated. Therefore, we may anchor the contractor's third year
step-ladder bids at $27,442 per unit for 100 units along the LC to
provide a visual reference point for further evaluation, as shown
in Figure 4.1. From this anchor point, we may compute the "honest"
bid prices at various quantity levels if the rate parameter is
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known or has been agreed upon or estimate the rate parameter if it
is unknown. The computational procedure has been discussed earlier
in this section.
QUANTITY ALLOCATION TECHNIQUE
When competitive pressure is not present in the market, as
discussed in the first section of this chapter, it is necessary for
the Government to ensure that the submitted bids are as close to
the honest "should cost" as possible. One alternative, used by the
Air Force A-10 System Program, 7 is to reguire a Certificate of
Current Cost or Pricing Data after determination of the award
split. However, this approach proves ineffective, as it was done
after the award split has been determined. The most logical
solution is to ensure that the bids are reasonable before they are
submitted. This section discusses this approach.
Two reguirements must be met if we want to ensure that the
contractors do not take advantage of the lack of competitive
pressure and submit inflated bids for any level of guantity.
First, the step-ladder bids, after adjustment of the learning curve
effect, should reflect a straight line on a log-log graph, i.e.,
Log (Z/Y) vs Log (R) as shown in Figure 4.1. Second, the rate
curve representing the step-ladder bids for various production rate
level should cross the long-term learning curve at the base
Darrell R. Hoppe , "Dual Award and Competition — You Can
Have Both," paper present at the 1977 Federal Acguisition Research
Symposium.
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production rate level. Both requirements are necessary in order
to discourage the contractor from unnecessarily "loading" the bids
at any quantity level. "Loading" the low quantity bids jeopardizes
the offeror's profit potential at higher quantity level, and vice
versa
.
The following four steps briefly describe the proposed quantity
allocation method when competitive pressure is not present. A more
detailed discussed of these individual steps, along with
illustrative examples, will follow.
Step 1: Calculate the Long-term Learning Curves.
A learning curve should be established for each contractor
by using their respective, initial two or more directed
buys which should be of equal quantity in order to avoid
the effect of different production rate on the learning
curve
.
Step 2: Request Step-ladder Bids.
Request step-ladder bids from each contractor for a range
of specific quantities of the total annual requirements
when each annual procurement solicitation occurs. The bid
solicitation should stipulate that the bids, after
adjustment for the learning curve effect, should reflect
a linear relationship as shown in Figure 4.1 and that the
linear line should cross the learning curve at the base
rate level.
Step 3: Determine the Total Cost for Each Quantity Combination.
For each quantity combination, calculate the total cost to
the government.
Step 4: Determine the Recommended Award Allocation.
From the total cost computed in Step 3 , determine the
quantity combination with the minimum cost.
It should be noted that the proposed quantity allocation method
utilizes the same basic rationale as the Minimum Total Cost Rule
discussed in chapter 1. The major difference is the bid price
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stipulation mentioned in Step 2, which is designed to prevent price
gaming.
ILLUSTRATION OF THE ALLOCATION METHOD
The four steps discussed above will be illustrated with a
numerical example in this section. We will assume that the
historical data for a missile program, Z, from prior directed buys
are as shown in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3
Initial Negotiated Annual Awards for Program Z
Contractor A Contractor B
Year Quantity Unit Price Quantity Unit Price
1 200 $37,404
2 200 26,390 100 $39,248
3 200 23,331 100 27,077
Step 1: Calculate the Learning Curves.
With three data point, the learning curve for Contractor A may
be computed with the familiar power curve function. For
Contractor B, it is necessary to use the formula discussed earlier
in this chapter to derive the curve from two data points. The
procedures have been illustrated earlier. The learning curve
equations computed from Table 4.3 data are shown below:
Contractor Equation Slope
A Y = 100,000 M ( " 2345) 85%
B Y = 90,000 M ( " 2515) 84%
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Step 2: Request step-ladder Bids.
Let us assume that step-ladder bids are to be solicited for
quantities ranqing from 20% to 80% of the 500 units annual
requirement, beqinninq in Year 4. Let us further assume that
Contractor B's production capacity is limited to 250 units per year
and, therefore, does not submit bids for quantities above that
level. As discussed earlier, the bid solicitation should stipulate
that the step-ladder bids, after adjustment for the learninq curve
effect, should reflect a linear line and that the linear line
should cross the learninq curve at the quantity level as the
directed buys. Table 4.4 shows the possible sets of bid data that
satisfy these requirements.
Table 4.4
Year 4 Step-Ladder Bids for Proqram Z
Bid aXb aXbRc Rc R










50 225 24,327 30,409 1.250 0.50
100 250 23,727 23,727 1.000 1
200 300 22,755 18,204 0.800 2
250 325 22,349 16,640 0.745 2.5
625 22,101 34,533 1.563 0. 25
650 21,904 27,380 1.250 0. 5
700 21,542 21,542 1.000 1
725 21,375 19,893 0.931 1. 25
750 21,217 18,621 0.878 1. 5
800 20,922 16,738 0.800 2




















The relationship between the step-ladder bids and previous
negotiated award prices is shown in Figure 4.4. Note that the line
representing A's step-ladder bids crosses its LC at Point I (A's
base production rate) while the line representing B's bids crosses
its LC at Point J (B's base production rate).
The slope of the rate curve may be determined by regressing the
Z/Y ratio on the rate measure (R) using the power curve function,
just like the learning curve slope calculation. The rate curve
equations computed from the values in the last two columns of Table
4.4 are shown below:
Contractor Equation Slope
A Z/Y = R ( - 3218) 80%
B Z/Y = R (v3218) 80%
The slope can be verified by checking the Z/Y ratio when the rate
measure is twice its base rate. For example, A's Z/Y ratio for
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400 units is 80% of the ratio at 200 units (the base rate)
,
reflecting the 80% curve at the first rate doubling point.
Step 3: Determine the Total Cost for Each Quantity Combination.
Based on the step-ladder bids from each contractor, we may
compute the total cost to the government for each guantity
combination, as shown in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5
Total Cost of Program Z under Different Quantity Combination
Contractor A Contractor B Total
Quan. Bid Total Quan. Bid Total Cost
50 34,533 1,726,641 450 no bid na
100 27,380 2,738,000 400 no bid na
200 21,542 4,308,400 300 no bid na
250 19,893 4,973,339 250 16,640 4,159,968 9,133,308
300 18,621 5,586,200 200 18,204 3,640,800 9,227,000
400 16,738 6,695,040 100 23,727 2,372,700 9,067,740
450 16,009 7,203,842 50 30,409 1,520,438 8,724,280
Step 4: Determine the Recommended Award Allocation.
Based on our calculation shown in Table 4.5, the lowest cost
plan for the Government is to award 450 units to A and 50 units to
B. Note that the result of this allocation method is contrary to
the one discussed in Chapter 3 . The method discussed in Chapter 3
is intended for the market scenario in which the incentive to
engage in price competition is present but the two contractors have
unegual competitive position. Therefore, the proposed allocation
method has the partial effect of improving the weaker contractor's
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competitive position for future periods.
On the other hand, the allocation method discussed in this
chapter is intended for a market in which the incentive to engage
in price competition is not present due to economic condition or
the lack of production capacity. Therefore, the allocation method
focuses on directly addressing the prevention of price gaming and
minimization of costs to the Government.
STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF THE PROPOSED ALLOCATION METHOD
We stress in the last section that the quantity allocation
method focuses on directly addressing the prevention of price
gaming. This objective is accomplished through the step-ladder bid
stipulation that the bids, after adjustment for the learning curve
effect, should reflect a linear line on a logarithmic scale and
that the linear line should cross the learning curve at the base
production rate level. We will assess the strength and weakness
of the allocation method in this section.
In our Program Z example, we assume that Contractor B has
production capacity for only 50% of the 500 units to be procured
annually, thus leaving Contractor A in virtual monopoly at the
higher quantity level. If A is a profit maximizer, a logical price
gaming strategy is to "load" the bids for high quantity levels, say
$17,422 per unit bid price for 90% of the requirement instead of
the honest $16,009. Since the bid solicitation stipulates that the
bid curve must cross the learning curve at Point I and the Z/Y
ratio must be a straight line, bids for all other quantity level
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must be recomputed as shown in Part A of Table 4.6. Note that this
seemingly logical bid loading strategy would have resulted in a
quantity awarded to A (50/50 split) than without price gaming, thus
reducing its profit potential. This disincentive alone would have
discouraged Contractor A from loading the bids at high quantity
levels.
Table 4.6
Quantity Allocation under Different Price Gaming Strategies
Contractor A Contractor B Total
Quan. Bid Total Quan. Bid Total Cost
A 1 1 s Attempt with Loaded Bids at Hiah Quantity Level
50 29,882 1,494,118 450 no bid na
100 25,470 2,546,977 400 no bid na
200 21,542 4,308,400 300 no bid na
250 20,362 5,090,487 250 16,640 4,159,968 9,250,456
300 19,425 5,827,594 200 18,204 3,640,800 9,468,394
400 17,993 7,197,168 100 23,727 2,372,700 9,569,868
450 17,422 7,839,886 50 30,409 1,520,438 9,360,324
34,533
R's Attempt as a Hacpy Loser
50 1,726,641 450 no bid na
100 27,380 2,738,000 400 no bid na
200 21,542 4,308,400 300 no bid na
250 19,893 4,973,339 250 15,279 3,819,778 8,793,117
300 18,621 5,586,200 200 17,066 3,413,250 8,999,450
400 16,738 6,695,040 100 23,727 2,372,700 9,067,740
450 16,009 7,203,842 50 32,436 1,621,800 8,825,642
Being the second source and with limited production capacity,
a common price gaming strategy for Contractor B is to be a "happy
loser," i.e., expecting to be awarded the low quantity, B may
attempt to load the bid at the minimum sustaining rate level. For
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example, Contractor B may be tempted to submit a bid for $32,436
per unit for 50 units instead of the honest $30,409 per unit bid.
Again, with the bid stipulation that the step-ladder bids must be
anchored at Point J as shown in Figure 4.4, raising the bid at the
low end must decrease the bid at the high end. The consequence is
the unexpected large quantity awarded (250 units vs 50 units) , but
at a depressed price. Again, this disincentive should discourage
B from attempting to become a "happy loser."
The allocation method addresses the prevention of loaded bids,
but not the legitimacy of the slope of the rate curve. One should
realize that the slope of the rate curve remains the same only if
the production setup remains the same. If the production setup is
changed, the slope of the production rate curve as well as the
anchoring point will be different. For example, if Contractor B's
production facility is expanded, its fixed costs will be increased,
which would result in a new rate curve with a steeper slope. The
unit cost of producing the minimum 50 units will be higher with the
expanded facility than without expansion. This also implies that
the anchoring point must be redetermined.
On the other hand, we may argue that changing production setup
results in heterogeneous environments which would make any
statistical analysis of the rate curve impossible. Therefore, the
problem facing the analyst in the determination of the rate curve
is not any different from the problem facing the analyst when




Given the multitude of opportunities for bid price manipulation
under the dual source competition environment, we discuss the
various market scenarios that provide these opportunities. Our
premise is that different quantity allocation methods must be
developed for different scenarios.
SUMMARY
Factors Contributing to Loaded Bids
In Chapter 2, four major factors contributing to inflated bids
were discussed: (1) the minimum sustaining rate, (2) the use of the
minimum total cost rule, (3) unequal competitive positions, and (4)
the lack of incentive to compete. The minimum sustaining rate
factor is a structural issue and cannot be directly addressed.
The minimum total cost rule, because of its potential effect on bid
manipulation by the contractor, should be treated as an objective
and not as a tool in awarding annual quantity requirements. The
last two factors both contribute to a noncompetitive environment
but they differ significantly from the standpoint of Government
controllability. Therefore, effort focuses on developing quantity
allocation methods for these two different environments.
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Unequal Competitive Positions
When one supplier has an edge in competitive position over the
other supplier, the cause of the problem must be redressed by the
Government if the future competitive environment is to be improved.
If the unequal position is the result of having one contractor
further down the experience curve, the problem can be alleviated
through the annual quantity allocation made to each contractor.
The proposed quantity allocation method under this environment uses
an objective function to minimize the sum of award prices and the
added costs (or savings) from competitive awards. Under unequal
competitive positions, we can expect bid price inflation at low
quantities from both suppliers. At higher quantities, only the
supplier with the competitive edge would be in a position to
inflate the bid price. By minimizing the added costs, the proposed
allocation procedure penalizes the supplier who inflates the bids
at higher quantities and offers the other supplier an opportunity
to catch up, thus improvinq the future competitive environment.
Competitive Pressure Is Not Present
There are two market scenarios in which the contractors would
have no incentive to enqaqe in price competition. The first is
that one of the contractors does not have the capacity to produce
the majority of the annual quantity requirements. This would
create a virtual monopoly for the other source at higher
quantities. Since competitive pressure never exists at lower
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quantities, this market condition essentially is a duopoly and not
a competitive one and should never be treated by the buyer as a
competitive market.
The same duopoly market exists if neither contractor is
interested in using low prices to capture the larger share of
annual quantity, even if the capacity is not a problem. This
phenomenon is most likely to be found in a period of economic boom.
By using the dual source competitive bidding under this
environment, the Government gives up much of the regulatory
authority it enjoys over verification of the contractor's cost and
pricing data, thus allowing both contractors to exploit the market
situation to their own advantage. Therefore, continuing the dual
source bidding under this market scenario is to sanction the
seller's profit enhancement strategies.
The difference in step-ladder bids in a particular year
essentially reflects the spread of fixed costs over varying number
of units produced, or the so-called production rate effect. In
Chapter 4, we discussed the measurement of production rate at
length. We illustrate the problems of using the traditional LC &
rate formula, which estimates the parameter value of the learning
curve and the rate curve simultaneously using the same data set.
Since the learning curve reflects the cumulative learning
experience while the rate curve reflects the production setup,
i.e., its cost structure, it is conceptually more logical and
operationally more feasible to estimate the parameter of each curve
with different data.
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The crux of the proposed quantity allocation method under this
market scenario is the bid solicitation stipulation that the step-
ladder bids, after adjustment for the learning curve effect, should
reflect a straight line on a logarithmic scale and that the line
should cross the learning curve at the base production rate level,
which is initially set at the same level as the directed buys. The
allocation of annual quantity requirements is then made by using
the minimum total cost rule.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The two quantity allocation methods discussed in this report
vary in their focuses on the grounds that each is intended for
different market scenarios. The allocation method proposed for the
market scenario with unequal competitive position has a primary
objective of enhancing future competitive environments and a
secondary objective of minimizing price gaming. An underlying
assumption is that true savings to the Government from dual source
competition is still possible if the Government can cultivate a
true competitive environment. On the other hand, the allocation
method proposed for the market in which competitive pressure is
not present directly addresses the prevention of bid price
manipulation. The underlying assumption is that true savings from
dual competition is not possible because the competitive pressure
is not present and the only alternative available to the Government
is to ensure, within its power, that bids submitted are "honest."
Our proposed allocation method is designed to provide a
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disincentive to submit loaded bids. This is illustrated with
numerical examples.
While the two quantity allocation methods are intended for
different market scenarios, it is also possible to have a hybrid
method by combining parts of each method. For example, the bid
price stipulation may be incorporated into the method proposed for
the market with unequal competitive positions. It would have the
benefit of preventing bid price manipulation, but the down side of
that is the loss of potential true savings. By anchoring the rate
curve at a certain point, it takes away the opportunity for truly
competitive pricing along with many opportunities for price gaming.
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APPENDIX
LIST OF ABBREVIATED VARIABLES
CAB-A = Average unit cost bid by Contractor A
CAB-B = Average unit cost bid by Contractor B
CAN = Average unit cost negotiated
CTB-A = Total bid Cost for that quantity from Contractor A
CTB-B = Total Bid Cost for that quantity from Contractor B
Est. CTD-A = Estimated Total Cost Differential included in the
associated Total Bid Cost for an annual procurement
quantity for Contractor A. It is the difference
between the Total Bid Cost and Estimated Total
Negotiated Cost at that quantity.
Est. CTD-B = Estimated Total Cost Differential included in the
associated Total Bid Cost for an annual procurement
quantity for Contractor B. It is the difference
between the Total Bid Cost and Estimated Total
Negotiated Cost at that quantity.
Est. CTN-A = Estimated Total Negotiated Cost of an annual award
quantity to Contractor A as determined with
extrapolation of the corresponding established
learning curve involved.
Est. CTN-B = Estimated Total Negotiated Cost of an annual award
quantity to Contractor B as determined with
extrapolation of the corresponding established
learning curve involved.
Q-A = Quantity of Contractor A's annual award
Q-B = Quantity of Contractor B's annual award
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